

economic characteristics and Alan Robinson's suggestive but now rather dated (1970) discussion of New Zealand's political culture. The second part has 4 articles dealing with "Institutional Fundamentals", covering New Zealand's constitution, the role of the Governor-General, the working of Parliament, and a descriptive outline of the system of local government. By far the largest part of the book concerns "The Dominant Actors". There are 19 articles on the executive, policy-making, caucus, Parliament, parties, pressure groups, the political development of the Maori people, women, the judiciary, and the pluralist-Marxist debate. The final part, on 'Electoral Choice', includes a discussion of New Zealand's single member plurality electoral system and the alternatives to it, influences on voting, and whether New Zealand counts as an 'elective dictatorship'. There is no bibliography and no index.

While there are some useful and interesting pieces in the collection (e.g. B.V. Harris on the constitution, Galvin on the executive, Skene on Parliament, Vowles on business and labour pressure groups, Hodder on the political role of the judiciary, and Mulgan on elective dictatorship), overall the collection is less than satisfying. The "perspective" of the title is not easily discerned, and there is no editor's introduction to explain the aim of the collection. The articles range from the basic and purely descriptive (such as those on how Parliament works and on local government, the latter reprinted from the *Official Yearbook!*) to Gold's and Bean's sophisticated analyses of voting behaviour. In between are some articles that are worthy, but seem better suited to publication in a journal than in a book which is presumably meant to make a reasonably enduring contribution to our understanding of New Zealand politics.

This volume thus continues the tradition established by the 2 Levine collections published in 1975 and 1978. The inherent limitations of such collections, consisting of relatively short pieces without the scope for sustained analysis and argument, suggest a challenge to those whose business it is to try to understand New Zealand politics. Where are our new Siegfrieds, Lipsoms, Milnes, Scotts, and Robinsons?

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Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1985). pp. 402. A\$29.95.

In 1947 the United Kingdom entered into a secret agreement with the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand known as the UKUSA Agreement. At the centre of this agreement was the establishment of arrangements for close cooperation in the areas of signals intelligence (SIGINT). Over the years, these arrangements have been extended to cover almost the entirety of the operations conducted by each country's security and intelligence agencies.

The terms of these arrangements are considered so secret that their very existence is top secret. As the US National Security Agency has written to one of the authors of *THE TIES THAT BIND*, the fact of the existence or non-existence of the UKUSA Agreement "is a currently and properly classified matter".

THE TIES THAT BIND is the first book to analyse the Agreement and its global and national implications. It describes: the inner workings of the major security and intelligence agencies in the participating countries; the history of the arrangements which created an international security and intelligence community (known as "The Club"); the global network of SIGINT stations; the practice of non-cooperation and deceit within the UKUSA intelligence community – how the UKUSA signatories use

their SIGINT facilities to eavesdrop *on each other*; the role of the security agencies in monitoring dissent in each country, including surveillance and interference in groups involved in peaceful and legal activities; the inefficiency, ineffectiveness and irresponsibility which characterises many operations.

The authors, Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball, are both internationally respected analysts in the field of defence policy in general and intelligence activities in particular. Their contribution to this latter, often murky area of scholarship is, of course, significant in these times of pronounced dissent, and in some cases deep division, within the Western Alliance. It is also, at the same time, a deeply disturbing document, as the above summary suggests.

While the UKUSA Agreement created a global network of security and intelligence cooperation based on the allocation of areas of national responsibility, the United States was, and is acknowledged to be, the dominant partner. In this role it controls access to the intelligence collected and determines its clearance. And there are positively, questionably moral and definitely undemocratic dimensions to this arrangement.

The international security and intelligence community created by the UKUSA Agreement now consists of a multitude of organizations bound together by an extraordinary network of written and unwritten agreements, working practices and personal relationships. As Richelson and Ball argue, it can and does shroud itself in secrecy and invoke the mantle of “national security” to an extent unmatched by each nation’s defence establishment. In addition, many of its elements not only have executive and coercive roles, including the “right” to undertake extreme and violent activities (such as assassination and “special political activities”) which are generally prohibited by national and international laws. And, finally, there are the problems created by its own self-image – which is defined in terms of its interests being transcendent over those of the national signatories, *and it acts accordingly*. To this extent, involvement in the processes of UKUSA is definitely not cost free, whatever the benefits which accrue from them.

The benefits, on the other hand, are thought to be well worth the price, not that a great deal of debate has been encouraged on this question. As Richelson and Ball detail it, the UKUSA community, which comprises more than a quarter of a million full-time personnel and a total budget of US\$16-18 billion, constitutes one of the largest bureaucracies in the world. If it is not always efficient, effective or responsible, it does at least have the advantages which accrue from a large scale operation which is leavened with international cooperation. For a country such as New Zealand the comparative advantage bestowed by membership was substantial: with a security community numbering only about 230, and a minuscule resource allocation, it derived benefits which were absolutely incommensurate with its status within the Alliance. Indeed, so great were these benefits (and so beyond effective executive control was the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service) that one question worthy of further investigation is the extent to which the ANZUS imbroglio has actually changed the nature of certain intelligence operations conducted under UKUSA – those concerned with ocean surveillance, for example. In view of the fact that such operations have a definite war-fighting significance, and that they are integral to a declared US maritime strategy which the Labour Government professes to abhor, there is no small irony to the claim in *The Ties That Bind* that the New Zealand signals intelligence facility at Tangimoana is “primarily responsible” for high-frequency traffic over the Southwest Pacific and across to Latin America.

It could just be, therefore, that the policy which was intended to remove New Zealand from the perils of nuclear defence is effectively contradicted by facilities which

actually support it. (Then again, since the secondary communications routing for the US early warning facility at Nurrungar, in South Australia, an acknowledged prime nuclear target, also runs through New Zealand, perhaps the abhorrence, too, is in need of closer scrutiny.)

Obviously, then, Richelson and Ball are addressing important issues and their work will have a deservedly interested readership in all of the UKUSA countries, not the least because Part I of *The Ties That Bind* represents the first comprehensive treatment of the intelligence community in each of the five signatory nations. For this reason alone it is a worthy addition to any reference collection. But in the more technical areas covering the forms of intelligence cooperation (and the limits thereto), signals and human intelligence, ocean surveillance and, for want of a better term, the politics of UKUSA's operations, it really comes into its own. The sources are extremely well documented, while the technical operations are reduced to comprehension for the a-technical reader (which will include a great number of those concerned with just the political aspects of UKUSA). In short, it represents a compendium of what a large number of international relations specialists and political scientists previously wanted to know but were unable to mount the research effort to find out. This quality of the book deserves emphasis: in line of pedigree from their earlier, related works (Richelson's *The American Intelligence Community* and Ball's *A Suitable Piece of Real Estate*), *The Ties That Bind* indicates a massive research enterprise which, thankfully, is complemented by organization, presentation and argumentation of the same high order.

In these terms it is a book which succeeds in its principal aim of catalysing debate around "the basic dilemma of how to balance the requirements of secrecy with those of democratic government" in the foreknowledge that the argument "cannot be resolved absolutely". For Australia, as for New Zealand, this need would appear to be acute. Across the Tasman it took until 1977 for the Australian Government to admit that the Defence Signals Directorate even existed, despite the fact that it, or an organization with essentially the same role, had existed for over thirty years, and had as well, become the principal Australian party to UKUSA — which Ball has described (in *A Suitable Piece of Real Estate*) as "probably the most important international agreement to which Australia is a signatory". In the interim, as he also states, no responsible Minister was apprised of DSD's relationships within UKUSA nor were the responsible Ministers ever briefed of its existence, facilities and operations.

In New Zealand the same combination of deceit and wilful ignorance met with approval. As the report by the Chief Ombudsman found in 1976, the Secret Intelligence Service was subject to but limited political control because of these habits:

the information [provided to the Prime Minister by the NZSIS] is not, on the whole, presented in a way which allows or encourages the [Prime] Minister to take any positive part in the presentation of the Service's programme . . . I am concerned that as a result the [Prime] Minister is not in a position to take those actions required of him by his responsibility and that the Service does not have the guidance it constitutionally should.

What *The Ties That Bind* does is to define the limits to which this situation is, or can ever be, different in an age when sophisticated intelligence gathering and assessment is thought to be a pre-requisite for the provision of national security.

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